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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether law enforcement officers operated within the framework of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine when they performed a dog sniff in front of Respondent’s house with a trained 
narcotics detection dog.
II. Whether a dog sniff of air emanating from the front door of a residence is the type of 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is reported at Jardines v. State. 
73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Florida Supreme Court pursuant 
to28U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court should review this case de novo. Decisions regarding a motion to suppress 
are reviewed de novo, although the underlying factual findings must be accepted unless they are 
clearly erroneous. United States v. Lingenfelter. 997 F.2d 632, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted). Whether police conduct amounts to a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. Id. at 637 (citation 
omitted). De novo review is also appropriate here because this case involves the question of 
whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required to support a certain type of 
warrantless search. “The ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make 
a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 
(1996) (citation omitted^: see also Alabama v. White. 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (holding on the 
basis of independent review that reasonable suspicion existed). In the interests of promoting 
clarity of precedent and adhering to well-established principles of appellate oversight, this Court 
should consider the present case under a de novo standard of review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Facts
On November 3, 2006, Detective William Pedraja received information from a crime 
stoppers tip that marijuana was being grown at a residence in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
located at 13005 SW 257th Terrace. (J.A. 3, 8.) One month later, on December 5,2006, 
Detective Pedraja drove to the house at 7:00 AM and observed it from a distance for 
approximately fifteen minutes. (J.A. 32.) During that time, he noticed that no vehicles were 
parked in the driveway, and that the blinds covering the front windows were closed. (J.A. 9.)
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At 7:15 AM, Detective Pedraja approached the outer porch area of the house, 
accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartclt and a leashed drug detection dog known as Frankie. 
(J.A. 32.) As they approached, Detective Pedraja stopped in the driveway and positioned himself 
a substantial distance behind Detective Bartelt and Frankie so as not to interfere with Frankie’s 
drug detection process. (J.A. 53, 59-60.) Detective Bartelt stopped at the entrance to the porch, 
underneath an archway approximately six to eight feet from the doorway to the house. (J.A. 45.) 
While there, he smelled and saw several mothballs. (J.A. 55.) Detective Bartelt then extended 
his arm and allowed Frankie’s leash to stretch to its full length of six feet to allow Frankie to 
move and inspect the air in his vicinity for the smell of narcotics. (J-A. 51.) At this point, 
Detective Bartelt stepped as far away from the porch as he could to allow Frankie room to utilize 
the full span of the leash. (J.A. 52.)
Frankie immediately alerted to the scent of narcotics. (J.A. 52.) After roving back and 
forth and sniffing for a few seconds, he sat down in front of the door, indicating the source of the 
smell, in accordance with his training. (J.A. 53.) Detective Bartelt then pulled Frankie out of the 
sitting position and took him back towards his vehicle. (J.A. 53.) As Detective Bartelt walked 
Frankie back towards Terrace Street, he notified Detective Pedraja that Frankie had detected the 
scent of narcotics. (J.A. 53.) Detective Bartelt then left. (J.A. 54.)
Detective Pedraja approached the doorway once notified that Frankie had smelled 
narcotics. (J.A. 36.) As Detective Pedraja reached the door, he caught a distinct whiff of live 
marijuana plants. (J.A. 36.) He knocked several times to see if anyone was home, so he could 
obtain consent for a search. (J.A. 9.) There was no response. (J.A. 37.) As he turned back 
toward the street and reached the base of the porch, he heard the air conditioning unit running 
continuously. (J.A. 37.) He observed that in spite of the early hour, in the colder temperatures
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of December, it continued to run non-stop for nearly twenty minutes. (J.A. 37.) In the absence 
of warm weather, this activity can indicate an effort by the resident to reduce excessive levels of 
heat generated by hydroponic heating lamps. (J.A. 7.)
Detective Pedraja has worked in the narcotics bureau of the Miama-Dade Police 
department for over seventeen years. (J.A. 31.) For the last four, he has dealt specifically with 
hydroponic marijuana labs. (J.A. 37.) He has received extensive training in the identification of 
narcotics from the Southeast Florida Institute of Criminal Justice, and from the Miami-Dade 
Police Department. (J.A. 5.) In his experience, a continuously running air conditioner, an empty 
driveway, and closed blinds constitute a distinct set of characteristics associated with houses in 
which hydroponic marijuana labs are being operated. (J.A. 38, 44.) After observing the house, 
Detective Pedraja left the scene to obtain a warrant for a search of the house based on these 
factors as well as the crime stoppers tip, his own observation of the smell of marijuana at the 
doorway of the house, and Frankie’s olfactory detection of a narcotic. (J.A. 8-9, 36-37.)
Frankie has performed approximately 656 narcotics detection tasks in the field. (J.A. 13.) 
His positive alerts to the smell of narcotics have resulted in the detection and seizure of 
approximately 13,008 grams of cocaine, 2,638 grams of heroin, 180 grams of methamphetamine, 
and 936,614 grams of marijuana. (J.A. 13.)
Detective Bartelt has worked with the Miami-Dade Police Department for nine years, six 
of which he has spent in the Narcotics Bureau. (J.A. 10.) As of the date of the incident, he had 
been a canine handler for over two and a half years. (J.A. 10.) He has received numerous 
certifications in the area of canine narcotics detection from the Miami-Dade Police Department, 
the International Forensic Research Institute, and the Fort Lauderdale Police Department. (J.A. 
11.) To date, his training has included hundreds of hours of Canine Narcotics Detection courses.
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as well as weekly maintenance training provided by the Narcotics Bureau of the Miami-Dade 
Police Department. (J.A. 11-12.)
Later on December 5, 2006, Judge George Sarduy of the County Court of the Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit of Florida signed a warrant and affirmed that probable cause existed for a search 
of the residence in question, given the indicators identified by Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt. 
(J.A. 110.) About an hour later, members of the Miami-Dade Police Department Narcotics 
Bureau entered the house through the front door. (J.A. 17.) As they did so, the occupant of the 
house, Joelis Jardines, attempted to flee the scene through a rear sliding glass door, but was 
almost immediately detained. (J.A. 17.) In an interview shortly afterwards with Detective 
Pedraja, Jardines made oral and written confessions. (J.A. 17.) Upon searching the house, 
officers found a marijuana hydroponics lab in the southwest comer. (J.A. 17.) The lab contained 
more than twenty-five pounds of live marijuana plants. (J.A. 112.)
Procedural History
The State of Florida charged Respondent with first degree Trafficking in Cannabis and 
third degree Grand Theft. (J.A. 17.) Prior to trial. Respondent filed a motion to suppress his oral 
and written confessions, and physical evidence discovered at his residence. (J.A. 16.) An
evidentiary hearing was held on June 8, 2007. (J.A. 21.) At the hearing, the trial court stated 
that the only factually similar case that concluded a dog sniff is a search was a Florida Appellate 
Court decision, State v. Rabb. 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The trial court 
postulated that the danger Rabb was trying to prevent was unchecked community sweeps for 
illegal activity. (J.A. 65.) Pursuant to Rabb. there were two issues the circuit court addressed at 
the evidentiary hearing; 1) whether any time a police officer uses a canine to investigate a home, 
that use is tantamount to a search, and 2) whether, if the canine had not been present, the
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independent facts would have established probable cause. (J.A. 64,98.) The trial court indicated 
that even if Rabb applies to exclude the dog sniff evidence, probable cause could still exist. (J.A. 
89.) Specifically, the presiding judge reasoned that an officer’s sensory perception of marijuana 
could be used as a basis for probable cause to get a search warrant. (J.A. 82.) Additionally, the 
presiding judge indicated that the blinds being shut, the air conditioner continuously running, and 
other facts independent of the dog sniff could be used to establish probable cause. (J.A. 98.)
Despite the trial court’s finding that probable cause existed outside of the dog sniff, the 
court granted Respondent’s motion to suppress. (J.A. 134.) Based upon Rabb, the trial court 
decided that use of a dog sniff at Respondent’s residence constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. (J.A. 134.) The trial court further decided, without reference to Detective 
Pedraja’s personal detection of live marijuana, that no evidence obtained independently of the 
dog sniff was sufficient to support the issuance of the search warrant. (J.A. 134-35.)
The State appealed this decision to the District Court of Appeal of Florida. Florida v. 
Jardines ('“Jardines I”). 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). First, the appellate court addressed 
the trial court’s determination concerning the dog sniff. Id at 4. The appellate court rejected the 
contention that under Kvllo v. United States. 533 U.S. 27 (2001), a dog sniff at a front porch is a 
Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 2. Reginninp with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), 
the appellate court cited a series of cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a dog sniff does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id at 4. The 
appellate court concurred with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Caballes that a dog 
sniff only detects contraband, and no one has a legitimate privacy interest in contraband. Id.
The appellate court distinguished Kvllo because the mechanical device used in Kvllo. unlike a 
dog sniff, revealed private activity protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id at 5. Further, the
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appellate court held that Respondent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the 
entrance of his residence. Jardines I. 9 So. 3d at 8. Finally, the appellate court determined that 
both the Detectives and Frankie had a right to be at Respondent’s front door, and facts identified 
in the affidavit, independent of the dog sniff, were sufficient to establish probable cause. Id.
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling because the Detectives had a right to 
approach Respondent’s residence with Frankie, Respondent had no expectation of privacy at his 
front door, and the dog sniff could only detect contraband. Id. at 10. The appellate court 
concluded that no illegal search occurred, Frankie’s presence at the residence did not negate 
Officer Pedraja’s detection of marijuana, and substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s 
determination that probable cause existed. Id The appellate court then certified a conflict with 
Rabb’s holding. Id
Respondent appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. Jardines v. Florida (“Jardines H”J. 
73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011). The Florida Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Respondent had 
a heightened expectation of privacy at his home, and a dog sniff is an intrusive procedure that 
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id at 36. The Florida 
Supreme Court determined that the dog sniff and the search that occurred after Detective Pedraja 
obtained his warrant was an intrusive, public procedure that lasted for hours. Id The Florida 
Supreme Court extended Kvllo’s protection of intimate information within a home to the front 
porch and entrance of a residence. Id at 44. The Florida Supreme Court emphasized the special 
protection given to the sanctity of a residence, and distinguished the United States Supreme 
Court cases that held a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search. Id at 45. The Florida 
Supreme Court further decided that because the dog had smelled the marijuana first, it was 
inconsequential that Detective Pedraja smelled marijuana at the entrance of the home. Id at 55.
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The Florida Supreme Court also concluded that probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, 
was the proper evidentiary showing the government must make prior to conducting a dog sniff of
a residence. Jardines IL 73 So. 3d at 54. The Florida Supreme Court recognized that there are 
special circumstances which allow a Fourth Amendment standard that stops short of probable 
cause, when a governmental interest outweighs a private interest. Id. at 52. However, the 
Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court would likely conclude 
that probable cause was necessary for a dog sniff, because this type of search is not used to find 
weapons. Id. at 53.
Justice Polston dissented. Id, at 61. He concluded that the court’s decision violated 
binding United States Supreme Court precedent. Id, (Polston, J., dissenting). Polston stated that 
despite statements about privacy interests in items and odors escaping a residence, the United 
States Supreme Court has ruled that there is no legitimate privacy interest in contraband under 
the Fourth Amendment. Id (Polston, J., dissenting). Polston reasoned that the very limited and 
unique type of detection involved in a dog sniff is the dispositive distinction under United States 
Supreme Court precedent, not whether the object sniffed is luggage, an automobile, or a home. 
Id. at 69 (Polston, J., dissenting).
The State of Florida petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which was granted on 
January 6,2012. (J.A. 144.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme Court to increase the 
efficacy of Fourth Amendment protections for United States citizens and prevent narcotics 
dealers from unreasonably exploiting legitimate privacy rights. The strenuous efforts of this
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Court to safeguard the privacy of Americans in their homes must not be misappropriated to 
preserve the insidious stealth of drug traffickers.
Three primary reasons demonstrate why this Court should hold that the sniff test 
performed on Respondent’s porch was not a Fourth Amendment search. First, Respondent did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the smell of live marijuana wafting in the air 
above his front porch. He failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in that smell, 
and society is not prepared to recognize the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in 
contraband, particularly in a public area, when evidence of criminal activity is observable from a 
public vantage point.
Second, the dog sniff did not implicate the privacy concerns this Court articulated in 
Kvllo V. United States. Dogs are not “sense-enhancing technology,” and they will not be 
developed to invade legitimate privacy rights in the future. Miami-Dade law enforcement 
officers obtained the scent of Respondent’s marijuana without “intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area.” And, the sniff test does not have the power to shrink a person’s guaranteed 
realm of privacy.
Finally, if the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling is affirmed, a number of longstanding 
United States Supreme Court cases will be called into question. Some will be necessarily 
overruled. Such a holding would needlessly convolute existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
increase the privacy rights of those possessing contraband in the home with no corresponding 
increase in protection for citizens engaged in harmless, legal activity. For these reasons, this 
Court should rule that the dog sniff performed in front of Respondent’s house was not a search.
However, if this Court finds that a Fourth Amendment search did occur, the standard to 
initiate such a search should be reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. This Court has
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recognized exceptions to the need for probable cause to perform a search when special needs 
make the probable cause requirement impracticable. When faced with such special needs, this 
Court balances the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of probable cause 
in the particular context. Reasonable suspicion is appropriate where the government interest is 
great, the privacy interest is low, and the intrusion caused by the search is minimal.
After Terry v. Ohio, and in the absence of facts amounting to probable cause, this Court 
has allowed police officers to adopt a non-intrusive intermediate response to the suspicion of 
criminal activity. In accordance with Terry, a search will be permissible in its scope when the 
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively 
intrusive. Reasonable suspicion requires that an officer be aware of specific articulable facts, 
and develop rational inferences from those facts that would reasonably warrant suspicion. A 
search is reasonable if the facts available to the police officer would warrant a man of reasonable 
caution to believe the search is appropriate. This Court held in Delaware v. Prouse that 
reasonable suspicion alleviates the concern for standardless, unconstrained searches.
The government has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly 
drugs for personal profit. A dog sniff is not a rash and unreasonable interference with privacy 
that requires probable cause to protect a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. The dog sniff is a 
less intrusive alternative to other search procedures, which might actually intrude into 
Respondent’s residence. Furthermore, Respondent did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the smell of contraband escaping his front door. Therefore, if a dog sniff is considered 
a search, it should require only reasonable suspicion to initiate.
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ARGUMENT
1. BECAUSE THE DOG SNIFF REVEALED ONLY THE PRESENCE OF NARCOTICS 
WITHOUT COMPROMISING RESPONDENT’S LEGITIMATE PRIVACY 
EXPECTATIONS, NO FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH OCCURRED.
The Fourth Amendment protects United States citizens from “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. It severely limits government interference in the private lives
of citizens, especially under the auspices of the home. Over time, the amendment has evolved
into a complex web of regulations requiring nimble adherence from government agents. The
Miami-Dade police officers who conducted a dog sniff at the home owned by Respondent were
careful to step through this complex web without breaking a strand. With the help of Frankie
and his highly precise sense of smell, the officers located twenty-five pounds of marijuana at
Respondent’s house, shut down his illegal hydroponic lab, and kept his marijuana from reaching
the streets-all without compromising his reasonable expectations of privacy.
To invoke the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment, a person must reasonably
expect that a given piece of information will remain private. To determine whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy, this Court has applied the two-part test found in Katz v.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In the words of Justice Harlan,
“The rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id As explained
below, Respondent’s alleged expectation of privacy in the presence of his marijuana fails both
parts of this test.
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A. Respondent Did Not Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Smell of
Marijuana Wafting Outside His House.
The privacy rights ascribed to houses by the Fourth Amendment do not automatically
bestow unfettered private status on anything within their physical confines. This Court has held
that physical location is not a dispositive factor in determining whether a search has occurred.
“The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz. 389 U.S. at 351. “What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area that is
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. Thus, the determinative inquiry
is whether person reasonably expects to have privacy in a given piece of infonnation. Id.
This Court has explicitly recognized that the Katz test controls whether a Fourth
Amendment search of a home has occurred. See Kvllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
This Court in Kvllo illustrated its application of Katz as follows:
We have subsequently applied [the Katz test] to hold that a Fourth Amendment 
search does not occur-even when the explicitly protected location of a house is 
concemed-unless “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the object of the challenged search, and society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.”
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207,211 (1986)). Here, 
Respondent never manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search (the smell of his marijuana), and society is not prepared to recognize an expectation of 
privacy in the smell of narcotics as reasonable. Therefore, the sniff test performed by officers in 
front of Respondent’s house was not a Fourth Amendment search.
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1. Respondent failed to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
smell of his marijuana.
To invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an individual must exhibit a 
subjective expectation of privacy in a given piece of information. Katz. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). In Katz, this Court held that a defendant exhibited a subjective expectation that 
the content of his phone call would not be intercepted when he stepped into a transparent phone 
booth and closed the door behind him. Id at 352. Although the defendant stood in a public area, 
and was visible to the public during the call, the Fourth Amendment protected the content of his 
conversation from FBI electronic surveillance because what the defendant had demonstrated a 
desire to exclude “was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear.” Id
Unlike the defendant in Katz. Respondent did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy regarding the type of sensory surveillance used to obtain information about his illegal 
activities. There is no evidence that he made an effort to hide the smell of his marijuana from the 
“uninvited nose.” That he grew his marijuana in a house, in itself, did not demonstrate that he 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the smells created by that marijuana. “A man’s home 
is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that 
he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them 
to himself has been exhibited.” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Although Respondent did conceal the marijuana in his home from visual surveillance, he 
exposed its smell to the plain observation of outsiders, including Detective Pedraja. This Court 
has never recognized the visual concealment of an item as a demonstration of a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the smell of that item. The justifications underlying “plain view” 
doctrine should not only apply to visual perceptions, but to other senses as well. See, e.g.. 
Miimesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“We think that [plain view doctrine] has an
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obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the 
sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search.”); United States v. Angelos. 433 F.3d 738, 747 
(10th Cir. 2006) (“The plain smell doctrine, in turn, is simply a logical extension of the plain 
view doctrine.”).
Respondent could have easily exhibited an expectation of privacy in the smell of 
marijuana wafting under his front door, but there is no evidence in the record that he did so. For 
example, he could have posted signs ordering people not to approach his house, built a fence 
around his front yard, or camouflaged the smell using another, stronger smell. He also could 
have made efforts to prevent air from escaping his house, such as placing a towel at the bottom 
of his front door, or installing an air-filtration system. Instead, he passively allowed the pungent 
smell to escape underneath his front door and into the “plain smell” of the public.
2. Respondent’s alleged expectation of privacy in the smell of his marijuana 
is not one that society is prepared to consider reasonable.
Even if Respondent had demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the smell of 
his marijuana, his expectation of privacy in contraband would have been categorically 
unreasonable and illegitimate. Respondent fails the second prong of the Katz test because as this 
Court has repeatedly held, no person has a legitimate privacy interest in contraband. Caballes. 
543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). “We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be 
deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of 
contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’” Id. at 408. Accord City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000) (“A sniff test by a trained narcotics dog is not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 
123 (1984) (holding that governmental conduct revealing only whether a substance is cocaine, 
and no other arguably “private” fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest); United States
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y. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a sniff test peiibrmed on a person’s luggage by 
a trained narcotics detection dog was not a search).
In Caballes, police officers stopped a defendant for speeding and performed a dog sniff 
on his vehicle while it was parked on the side of a road. Caballes. 543 U.S. at 406. The dog 
alerted to the smell of marijuana in the defendant’s trunk, and officers searched the car based on 
only the dog’s alert. Id This Court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred, refusing to 
legitimize the desire of a person in possession of contraband to keep that contraband private from 
law enforcement. “The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity 
will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations 
concerning non detection of contraband.” Id at 410.
Like the defendant in Caballes, Respondent’s hope that the contraband in his house 
would not be discovered is categorically distinguishable from a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in lawful activity. As further explained below, there was no information about Respondent’s 
lawful activity at risk of being discovered by the law enforcement agents who conducted the 
sniff test—only his illegal activity was exposed, meaning that even though Respondent kept his 
marijuana in house, the Fourth Amendment principles of Caballes and its predecessors should 
still govern this Court’s decision.
These principles may appear at first glance to contradict this Court’s decision in Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 27. However, the two rulings coincide. In Kyllo, this Court held that a defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy over the heat emanating from his house as a result of his 
marijuana lab. Id at 41. This Court made clear in Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, that its ruling was 
“entirely consistent” with Kvllo, explaining that the two cases were distinguishable because it 









activity.” Caballes. 543 U.S. at 409. In the present case, Miami-Dade law enforcement officers 
used Frankie, a dog that is not capable of revealing legal activity, to locate Respondent’s 
marijuana. Accordingly, a straightforward application of this Court’s ruling in Caballes should 
not be precluded by a misplaced reliance on principles from Kvllo. 533 U.S. at 27.
Society is not prepared to recognize the reasonableness of Respondent’s expectation of
privacy in contraband merely because he grew that contraband within his home. Marijuana is
currently a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (c)(17)
(West 2012). Under federal law, it is illegal to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense” marijuana,
regardless of where that activity takes place. Id § 841 (a)(1) (West 2010). Likewise, all fifty
states have outlawed the manufacture, distribution, and dispensation of marijuana by anyone for
non-medicinal purposes. Society has made its stance on marijuana clear, and Congress has not
carved out an exception for those who choose to manufacture their marijuana at home.
Moreover, Respondent forfeited his right to privacy in the smell of marijuana emanating
from his home when he passively allowed that smell to become observable from a “public
vantage point.” Ciraolo. 476 U.S. at 213. In Ciraolo. police received an anonymous tip that a
defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard. Id at 209. An officer was unable to observe
the defendant’s backyard from the street because the defendant had enclosed the yard within two
fences-a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence. Id Undeterred, the officer chartered a
private airplane and flew over the house at an altitude of 1000 feet. Id While passing over the
defendant’s house, he observed marijuana growing in the backyard. Id This Court held that no
Fourth Amendment search occurred, reasoning as follows:
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to 
require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken 
measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations
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from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly visible.
476 U.S.at213.
Like the police officer in Ciraolo. Detective William Pedraja observed Respondent’s 
marijuana from a public vantage point: Respondent’s front porch. While the officer in Ciraolo 
used advanced aerial technology to gain access to the airspace above the defendant’s house, 
Detective Pedraja simply walked up to Respondent’s front porch after a positive alert from 
Frankie. (J.A. 53, 59-60.) He then smelled Respondent’s marijuana. (J.A. 39.) Detective 
Pedraja did not resort to a “public vantage point” that the vast majority of the public is unable to 
access, such as the airspace above Respondent’s home. Any member of the public could have 
legally stood on Respondent’s front porch and smelled the marijuana coming from his house, 
while very few people could have flown over Respondent’s house with a small plane to observe 
his property.
Respondent’s porch was a public vantage point because a front porch is a public place,
and a homeowner does not have a constitutionally protected right of privacy there. United States
V. Santana. 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). In Santana, this Court declined to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to a defendant on her porch, explaining that:
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of 
one’s dwelling is “private” ... it is nonetheless clear that under the cases 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment [the defendant] was in a “public” place. She 
was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy.
Id. Because “[the defendant] was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to
public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside
her house,” she had no legitimate expectation of privacy on her porch. 427 U.S. at 42.
See also State v. Morsman. 394 So. 2d 408,409 (Fla. 1981) (“Under Florida law it is
clear that one does not harbor an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen 
or visitors may appear at any time.”).
Like the defendant in Santana. Respondent’s front porch is a public place, and he does 
not possess a right of privacy in information he exposes there. Although Respondent was not 
physically standing outside when the dog sniff took place, the smell of his marijuana was 
broadcast to the public and became observable from a public vantage point when that smell left 
Respondent’s house and entered the air above his porch. Respondent’s alleged expectation of 
privacy in that smell is thus unreasonable under this Court’s ruling in Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
Society is not prepared to accept that it is reasonable for law enforcement agents to 
intentionally ignore signs of illegal activity when any member of the public could easily observe 
those signs. “The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of 
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.” California v. 
Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35,41 (1988). In Greenwood, this Court held that the defendants did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of garbage bags left on the curb in front 
of their house, primarily because the area was “accessible to the public,” and “particularly suited 
for public inspection.” Id. at 40-42. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) 
(“A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”).
Like the defendants in Greenwood. Respondent knowingly and voluntarily exposed 
personal information to the public. As a result, he forfeited his right to Fourth Amendment 
protections with regard to the information contained in that scent. Although the presence of 
smell is less visually obvious than the presence of trash bags, a detective was able to smell 
Respondent’s marijuana while standing in front of Respondent’s house. Any member of the
public with a normal sense of smell could have also smelled the odor, just as any member of tlie 
public could have rifled through the defendants’ garbage in front of the house in Greenwood. 
Although the front porch may not be “particularly suited for public inspection” to the extent that 
the curb was suitable for visual inspection in Greenwood, the air in front of a house is public air, 
and anyone is free to explore its contents by smelling it.
The Fourth Amendment should not be interpreted to implicitly sanction the possession of 
narcotics in homes. Existing case law specifically withholds privacy protections from 
individuals seeking to extend those protections over their contraband. Respondent never 
demonstrated an expectation of privacy in the smell of marijuana wafting from his house, and 
society is not prepared to consider Respondent’s alleged expectation of privacy in his contraband 
as reasonable. Thus, Respondent fails both prongs of the Katz test.
B. The Dog Sniff Was Not a Fourth Amendment Search Pursuant to thg Standards
Articulated bv this Court in Kvllo.
In Kvllo. 533 U.S. at 28, this Court held that an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights have been violated when an agent of the government “obtain[s] by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not have otherwise 
been obtained without intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, at least where ... the 
technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
described the primary question faced by this Court as “what limits there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.” Id. at 34. Since a dog sniff does not have 
the power to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy, this Court’s ruling in Kyllo suggests that the 
dog sniff performed in front of Respondent’s house was not a Fourth Amendment search.
The facts of Kvllo differ from the facts of the present case in several significant ways. 
Police officers in Kvllo used an electronic thermal imaging device to determine how much heat
was emanating from a defendant’s house. Kvllo. 533 U.S. at 29. The scanner “operate[d] 
somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.” Id. at 30. Unlike the police officers in 
Kvllo. the law enforcement agents who conducted the dog sniff in front of Respondent’s house 
did not (1) use sense-enhancing technology; (2) obtain any information that “could not have 
otherwise been obtained without intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” id. at 28; or (3) 
search Respondent’s home using a method that had the potential to shrink the realm of his 
guaranteed privacy rights. Id. at 34. Frankie’s drug sniff test falls outside the scope of this 
Court’s Fourth Amendment concerns as expressed in Kvllo. and elsewhere.
1. Miami-Dade law enforcement officers did not use “sense-enhancing 
technology” to discover Respondent’s marijuana.
Frankie did not enhance the senses of any officer, and he does not qualify as technology. 
In Kvllo. police officers used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager and looked into its 
viewfinder to personally observe the concentration of heat escaping from the defendant’s house. 
Id. at 29-30. In the present case, law enforcement officers relied on an alert from their drug- 
detection dog, Frankie, to determine the probability of the existence of marijuana. They did not 
somehow use the dog to smell the marijuana themselves. Frankie did not enhance any person’s 
sense of smell.
Frankie also does not properly qualify as “technology,” in the sense that this Court 
contemplated in Kvllo. See Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004) (“A dog is not 
technology—he or she is a dog ... people consider dogs as members of their family. The same 
cannot be said of cars, blenders, or thermal imagers.”). Other examples of potentially intrusive 
technology cited by this Court included wiretapping, microphones, a pen register, and other 
forms of electronic technology. Kvllo. 533 U.S. at 34-39. All of these examples are man-made 
mechanisms designed to transcend the limits of human ability. Frankie, by contrast, is neither
man-made, nor a mechanism. Although he has received training, his excellent sense of smell has 
been not been imparted to him by technology. Dogs have had superior senses of smell for 
hundreds if not thousands of years, and humans have long relied on their abilities. Evidence 
produced by bloodhounds “was looked upon with favor as early as the twelfth century.” Blair v. 
Commonwealth. 204 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1918). Frankie could only qualify as “technology” on 
the basis of a flimsy semantic association.
2. Officers discovered the presence of marijuana at Respondent’s house
without obtaining information that would have been otherwise impossible 
to obtain without intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.
A dog sniff does not enable an unconstitutional intrusion. The sniff “does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view ... [it] discloses only 
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband Item.” Place. 462 U.S. at 707. “The canine 
sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in 
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed 
by the procedure.” Id
In Place, this Court held that a dog sniff performed on a traveler’s luggage was not a 
search because the sniff did not intrude on any constitutionally protected privacy interests. Id 
This Court explained that although a person does have a Fourth Amendment right of privacy in 
the contents of his or her luggage, that right does not prohibit law enforcement officers from 
using investigative techniques that reveal nothing about the luggage except the presence or 
absence of contraband. Id at 707. See also Edmond. 531 U.S. at 40 (“Like the dog sniff in 
Place, a dog sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is ‘much less intrusive than a typical 
search.’”).
Likewise, in the present case, Miami-Dade law enforcement officers did not intrude on 
Respondent’s constitutionally protected privacy interests, or obtain information through an 
intrusive method. The dog sniff fell explicitly within the standards for dog sniff tests that have 
been applied by this Court. Even though privacy protections in the home are at their height, the 
uniquely precise nature of the dog sniff avoids putting any private information at risk. Even if 
Miami-Dade law enforcement officers had never enlisted the support of Frankie, the smell of 
Respondent’s marijuana would still have been observable “without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area.” Kvllo. 533 U.S. at 34. Detective Pedraja smelled the 
marijuana himself while standing on the front porch of Respondent’s house. (J .A. 36.) Since the 
porch is a public area, Detective Pedraja was lawfully present there when he observed the smell 
of Respondent’s marijuana. Santana. 427 U.S. at 42. By contrast, the law enforcement 
officers in Kvllo could not have seen the heat being emitted from the roof of the defendant’s 
house without the use of their thermal scanner, meaning they would have been unable to obtain 
the information about the warmth of the defendant’s house without impermissibly intruding into 
that house. In this way, the investigative methods of Katz and Kyllo are fundamentally different.
3. In the future, the dog sniff will not become increasingly intrusive or shrink 
the guaranteed realm of privacy that citizens possess in their homes.
In Kvllo. this Court expressed concern that police surveillance technology, if allowed to 
develop without meaningful restraint, could “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment.” 533 U.S. at 34. “While the [thermal imaging device] used in the present case was 
relatively crude,” this Court stated, “the rule we must adopt must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” Id. at 36. Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that the thermal image scanner appeared to have little potential for invasive 
surveillance, but he contemplated the development of future devices, such as “imaging
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^ technology that could discern all human activity in the home.” Kvilo. 533 U.S. at 35-36.
Unlike the fast-advancing forms of surveillance technology referenced by this Court in Kvilo. 
drug detection dogs will not erode the privacy rights of United States citizens in the future 
# because “[d]ogs are not advancing technology. Even taking into account potential gains from
evolution, breeding, and improved nutrition, the limits to dogs’ future ability to smell are not far 
from the current limits.” Fitzgerald. 864 A.2d. at 1016.
^ Currently, the sniff test presents minimal risk of abuse by law enforcement. The notion
that officers will suddenly begin performing arbitrary dragnet-style dog sniffs on houses does not 
square with reality. First, canine sniff searches of homes are dangerous, posing safety risks to 
handlers and their dogs, who must approach the doorway of suspected grow houses while 
vulnerable to attack from a firearm. “Firearms are as much tools of the trade as are most 
commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia.” Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 106 
(1979). Second, it would be prohibitively inefficient, and time consuming to take dogs to 
random houses in Miami-Dade County to perform dog sniffs. “Dog sniffs are least effective 
0 when they survey a random population.” Robert Bird, An Examination of the Training and
Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog. 85 Ky. L.J. 405,430 (1997). Officers have a strong 
incentive to perform sniff tests as part of a coordinated effort. “A sniff conducted in tandem with 
^ law enforcement expertise will most likely result in minimal mistakes and successful seizures of
narcotics.” Id at 432. Finally, in the twenty-nine years since this Court decided Place, 462 U.S. 
at 709, scant evidence of discriminatory application has arisen. In the unlikely event that 
discriminatory enforcement becomes a substantial problem in the future, “the constitutional basis 
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, 
not the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United States. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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^ C. The Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling Contradicts and Convolutes Existing Fourth
Amendment Doctrines.
This Court has emphasized the importance of clearly demarcating the privacy rights 
associated with the home. “The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the
0
house. That line, we think, must be not only firm, but also bright-which requires clear 
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.” Kyllo. 533 U.S. at 40 
^ (citing Payton v. New York. 445 U.S. 473 (1980)). The Florida Supreme Court ruling destroys
the bright line specifications previously established by this Court and calls into question a wide 
variety of ftindamental constitutional privacy doctrines. The ruling recognizes the right to an 
0 expectation of privacy in contraband, which explicitly contradicts Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. It
asserts that the front porch of a house is a constitutionally protected area, in conflict with this 
Court’s holding in Santana. 427 U.S. at 38. It requires police officers to.ignore the smell of 
* marijuana on front porches, information that any member of the public could observe firom a
public vantage point, which explicitly contradicts Ciraolo. 476 U.S. at 207. It disregards a 
straightforward application of the two-part test in Katz. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), 
even though subsequent Supreme Court decisions have specifically held that the test applies to 
homes. It also ignores the specific privacy concerns elucidated in Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
Instead of clearly applying existing law, the Florida Supreme Court decision contradicts
0
and convolutes existing precedent to create an anomalous standard for dog sniffs. In support of 
its ruling, the court claims to be preventing the threat of “public opprobrium, humiliation, and 
^ embarrassment,” within the sanctity of the home. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 49. It also refers to a
threat of “arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Id. Neither preemptive effort is appropriate 
here. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent was subjected to public opprobrium by 





Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court points to no evidence in its opinion that demonstrates a 
likelihood of discriminatory enforcement. Perhaps more importantly, law enforcement officers 
have no incentive to apply the tests discriminatorily in the first place, given the safety concerns 
and impracticability of arbitrary enforcement measures.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not “assure preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” United 
States v. Jones. 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). Instead, it creates a new exception in the law that 
only serves to benefit those who manufacture and possess contraband within homes. The 
framers of the Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment to protect legitimate privacy rights, 
not to designate the home as a safe harbor for the manufacture and possession of contraband. 
Contrary to the contentions of the Florida Supreme Court, the dog sniff does not pose a 
substantial danger to legitimate privacy rights. It endangers only the illegitimate interests of 
drug traffickers who have infiltrated residential areas. At no time was Respondent subjected to 
an unreasonable search of his home. Miami-Dade law enforcement officers carefully preserved 
his legitimate expectations of privacy while successfully locating his marijuana. The broad 
realm of his guaranteed privacy rights in the home were undiminished by the dog sniff. For 
these reasons, this Court should rule that the dog sniff performed in front of Respondent’s house 
was not a Foixrth Amendment search.
II. IF A DOG SNIFF IS CONSIDERED A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IT IS A MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE SEARCH REQUIRING LESS 
THAN PROBABLE CAUSE.
The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 
“reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law 
enforcement agents, in order “to safeguard the privacy and security of Individuals against
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arbitrary invasions.” Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (citation omitted).
“Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.” Id at 654. The reasonableness standard only requires that the facts 
upon which an intrusion is based be measured against an objective standard, whether this is 
probable cause or a less stringent test. Id “Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly 
be carried out without a warrant-must be based upon probable cause to believe that a violation 
of the law has occurred.” New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). “However, in 
certain limited circumstances probable cause is not required.” Id (citation omitted). When the 
balance of interests precludes the insistence upon a standard of probable cause, other safeguards 
are relied upon to assure that an official in the field does not intrude into an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Prouse. 
440 U.S. at 654-55.
A. Reasonable Suspicion Is the Appropriate Standard fora Dog Sniff.
“The rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been 
recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.” Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 
1, 12 (1968). Evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process approves 
some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves unreasonable 
actions by state agents. Id. at 13. Courts retain their “traditional responsibility to guard against 
police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security 
without the objective evidentiary justification.” Id. at 15. The court is required to exclude 
evidence that was obtained through a search predicated on less than reasonable suspicion. Id.
1. Reasonable suspicion provides adequate protection to the extent that
Respondent has an expectation of privacy in odors escaping his residence.
“What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable 
searches.” Terry. 392 U.S. at 9 ('quoting Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222 (I960)). At 
the “heart of the Fourth Amendment... is a severe requirement of specific justification for any 
intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial 
controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution.” Id. at 11. 
The function of the court is to prevent the government from using the fruits of a lawless invasion 
into the constitutional rights of citizens. Id. at 13. The conduct of police officers must be 
subjected to the detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who will evaluate the reasonableness of a 
particular search in light of the particular circumstances. Id. at 21. The reasonableness of a 
search is judged against an objective standard, which determines if facts available to the officer 
would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe the search was appropriate. Id. at 21-22.
Reasonable suspicion should alleviate this Court’s concern about unconstrained 
discretion of police officers to perform searches on a whim. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. To govern 
an officer’s exercise of discretion, this Court must insist upon an appropriate factual basis for 
suspicion directed at a particular individual. Id- Police officers must be aware of specific 
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant 
suspicion of criminal activity. Id, at 655-56 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 884 (1975)). Therefore, the requirement of reasonable suspicion protects individuals from 
indiscriminate official interference. Id at 656 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883).
Under a standard of reasonable suspicion, the court shall hold the ultimate safeguard 
against an intrusion into an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and will enforce upon
police officers an incentive to base a search on specific articulable facts. In determining whether 
the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Therefore, 
reasonable suspicion prevents arbitrary invasions of privacy by making police officers 
accountable to the court, which acts as a gatekeeper to all evidence gathered against a defendant.
2. Reasonable suspicion is appropriate where the balance of interests weighs 
in favor of the government.
Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search is not reasonable unless it is 
accomplished pursuant to a finding of probable cause. Skinner v. Rv. Labor^ecutives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). However, this Court has recognized exceptions to this rule when 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the probable cause 
requirement impracticable. Id (citation omitted). When faced with such special needs, this 
Court balances the governmental interest against the privacy interests of an individual to assess 
the practicality of the probable cause requirements in the particular context. Id
The balancing test used by this Court to decide the appropriateness of reasonable 
suspicion measures the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of Citv & Cntv. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 
534-35, 536-37 (1967)). The governmental interest needed to uphold the official intrusion must 
be justified at its inception, and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
rationalized the interference in the first place. Id at 20. Additionally, this Court must weigh the 
privacy interests of citizens subject to a search, to ensure that such intrusions are not random or 
arbitrary. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 621-22.
When an important governmental interest is at stake, a minimally intrusive procedure, in
the absence of practical policing alternatives, will allow for an investigation into the 
circumstances that provoked the suspicion. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. at 881. However, against 
this valid government interest this Court must weigh the interference with individual liberty that 
results from the police officer’s conduct. Id. at 879-80. Therefore, certain procedures may be 
justified on reasonable suspicion, because of the limited nature of the intrusion. Id at 880.
Where special needs exist, this Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prevent a policeman who lacks probable cause to adopt an intermediate response to the 
prevention of a criminal act. Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). In Adams, an 
officer’s search and seizure of a loaded gun constituted a limited intrusion designed to ensure his 
safety, and was therefore reasonable. Id. at 148. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987), 
this Court held that in the interest of public safety, police officers may conduct a warrantless 
search where a gun had been fired through the floor of a residence. To increase the likelihood 
that police will prevent the flow of narcotics, this Court in Place, 462 U.S. at 704, created an 
exception to the probable cause standard for dog sniffs performed on an individual’s luggage.
In Bell V. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), this Court reasoned that the discovery of 
contraband, and prevention of criminal activity allowed for body cavity searches predicated on 
reasonable suspicion. Here, the dog sniff is an intermediate response to detect the presence of 
hydroponic marijuana labs within a neighborhood. Additionally, the dog sniff is less intmsive 
than any of the aforementioned search techniques.
In Terry, this Court questioned “whether it is always unreasonable for a [police officer] to 
seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for 












less than probable cause it will be judged consistent with the manner in which the officer 
conducted the search, and upon the preconditions which the search was initiated. Terrv. 392 
U.S. at 28-29. This Court found the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the suspect was 
armed, it was necessary for him to discover any possible weapons, and he restricted his search to 
items which justified his suspicion. Id at 30. Therefore, a court may validate search procedures 
which are limited and necessary, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 
“full” search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. Id at 26.
3. All searches conducted under a standard of reasonable suspicion must be 
limited in scope to the objectives of the search.
A court will only find that the government’s interest outweighs that of an individual’s 
interest in privacy when the search is conducted with a prerequisite finding of fact to suffice 
reasonable suspicion. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. at 883. For instance, this Court in Brignonj- 
Ponce held that an individual’s interest in participating in the flow of traffic cannot be abridged 
without some sort of suspicion that he is engaged in illegal activity. Id Officers would be 
allowed to stop vehicles traveling on a highway if there was reasonable suspicion that the vehicle 
may contain illegal immigrants. Id at 881. However, this Court would not allow for roving- 
patrol stops of all vehicles without any suspicion of illegal activity. Id at 883. This Court 
reasoned that roving stops, without a prerequisite finding of fact, would subject residents to 
potentially unlimited interference with their privacy while using the highway. Id at 882. 
Therefore, there must be a prerequisite finding of fact to suffice reasonable suspicion.
The scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. A search may be justified in its 
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence 
that the suspect has or is violating the law. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 341-42. The search will be
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permissible when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives that justified the 
search. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 342.
In Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 88-89, police officers performed a patdown search of an 
individual, only because he was present at a bar which was the subject of a search warrant for 
drugs. The search warrant allowed the police officers to search the bar and one named bartender 
for evidence of drugs. Id at 88. There was no reason for the police officers to suppose that 
every person found on the premises would be in possession of drugs. Id. at 90. Furthermore, 
“Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, [and] made no movements that might 
suggest an attempt to conceal contraband.” Id. at 91. The patdown of Ybarra was outside the 
scope of the specific facts that justified the original search. Id. at 93.
It is useful to compare Ybarra’s unjustified search to an intrusive search that this Court 
found justified within the scope of facts on which it was initiated. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 347. 
In T.L.O.. a high school administrator rifled through a student’s purse because she had been 
caught smoking cigarettes in the school bathroom. Id at 328. While the administrator’s initial 
glance revealed a pack of cigarettes, he also discovered rolling papers, which prompted him to 
conduct a full search of the purse. Id The administrator discovered marijuana, a smoking 
device, and evidence that the girl was distributing drugs for remuneration. Id This Court held 
that the search was justified, because the administrator had reasonable suspicion to believe the 
student had cigarettes in her purse. Id at 345. This Court then held that the administrator’s 
further exploration into the purse was justified because he discovered evidence of additional 
contraband. Id at 347. Therefore, the balance of interests will weigh in favor of the government 
and reasonable suspicion will be the appropriate prerequisite standard for a search when the
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scope of the objective is limited to the facts that initiated the suspicion for the search. T.L.O.. 
469 U.S. at347.
4. Under a standard of reasonable suspicion a police officer will not be 
permitted to conduct searches based upon unfettered discretion.
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires this Court to
acknowledge the possibility that any search may be conducted in an abusive fashion. Wolfish.
441 U.S. at 560. This Court is then required to ensure that such abuse is not condoned, and
judge whether or not the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. Id This Court must
ultimately decide if the search can ever be conducted on less than probable cause. Id
Wolfish questioned the constitutionality of inmate strip searches without probable cause.
Id. at 558. This Court decided that these searches were an effective technique to deter, among
other things, inmates smuggling contraband into the prison. Id at 559. Though the degree to
which these searches invaded the personal privacy of the inmates was severe, this Court held that
governmental interest in discovery of contraband was more compelling. Id at 560. In deciding
whether or not the searches could ever be conducted under less than probable cause, this Court
reasoned that risk of guards abusing this procedure was trivial. Id
Even where the government has a valid law enforcement interest, and police conduct is
minimally intrusive, this Court will invalidate a procedure which allows the police unfettered
discretion. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 661. This Court in Prouse recognized the grave danger of abuse
of discretion that results from inspections unaccompanied by articulated suspicion. Id at 660. In
Prouse, a police officer conducted routine vehicle stops when he observed neither traffic or
equipment violations, nor any suspicious activity. Id at 650. The officer stopped the
individual’s vehicle simply to check his driver’s license and registration. Id The government
argued that the arbitrary stop was necessary to ascertain compliance with vehicle registration
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requirements. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 660. This Court held that an individual could not be subjected 
to “unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile.” Id at 663. “This 
kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil this Court has discerned when in 
previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed.” Id 
at 661.
As with the full body cavity searches performed in Wolfish, there is a risk that police 
officers will abuse the use of a dog sniff. However, a search may be predicated on reasonable 
suspicion when there is such a strong governmental interest that the risk of abuse becomes 
trivial. Furthermore, reasonable suspicion prevents searches based upon unfettered and 
standardless police discretion. The decisions in Prouse and Brienoni-Po.nce indicate that a 
governmental interest will outweigh an individual’s privacy interest when discretion to perform a 
search is circumscribed by the need for articulated facts to justify the search.
5. Reasonable suspicion is the applicable standard here because the 
government’s interests outweigh Respondent’s interests.
“The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly 
drugs for personal profit.” United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980). “Few 
problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly our young, cause 
greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.” Id. “Much of the drug traffic 
is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated criminal syndicates.” Id at 561-62. Drugs . 
.. may be easily concealed ... and as a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may 
be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.” Id. at 562.
The government’s interest in shutting down hydroponic labs is high, and Respondent’s 
interest in protecting the sanctity of smells escaping his front door is low. At the time this 
hydroponic lab was discovered, it had produced twenty-five pounds of marijuana for sale on the
streets. (J.A. 112.) There is a government interest in locating and shutting down drug 
manufacturing of this magnitude. The persons cultivating in such sophisticated labs will attempt 
to conceal the presence of marijuana. (J.A. 7.) The dog sniff is one of the few ways in which 
police officers can accurately confirm the presence of marijuana. (J.A. 13.)
Respondent’s privacy interest does not outweigh the government’s interest in effective 
and efficient law enforcement. Respondent does not have a reasonable expectation that officers 
will not walk up to his front door. See Santana. 427 U.S. at 42 (holding that a suspect standing 
outside her front door is not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy). Nor does this 
Court recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence of contraband. Caballes, 
543 U.S. at 408. The government interest in confirming the smell of marijuana outweighs that of 
Respondent’s ability to confine the smell to his residence.
In comparison to the significant governmental interest, the manner of search here is 
minimally intrusive. The manner in which information is obtained through a dog sniff is much 
less intmsive than a typical search. Place. 462 U.S. at 707. A dog sniff by a well-trained 
narcotics detection dog does not require physical intrusion into a private residence or one’s 
effects. Id. ‘Tt does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from 
public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage.” 
Id. The limited disclosure of contraband “ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected 
to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive 
investigative methods.” Id. Furthermore, in the past this Court has allowed search procedures 
which are far more intrusive than a dog sniff to be predicated on reasonable suspicion.
A dog sniff is not a rash and unreasonable interference with privacy that requires 
probable cause to protect a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. Ytiarra, 444 U.S. at 95-96.
Unlike the search performed in Ybarra, the dog sniff here was predicated upon reasonable 
suspicion. See Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 93. Further, unlike a patdown search, the dog sniff did not 
physically intrude onto Respondent’s person, and was within the scope of the articulated facts 
which led to the suspicion of the presence of contraband at the residence. Id. at 88. Like Terrv. 
the dog sniff may be characterized as an intermediate response to prevent criminal activity and 
unlike Terrv. is not seriously intrusive.
6, When the balance of interests weighs in favor of the government, well-
trained police officers may utilize special methods to discover articulable 
facts which amount to reasonable suspicion.
When the government interest in preventing drug traffic is great and the intrusion upon 
the individual’s privacy is minimal, specially trained officers may act pursuant to well-planned 
and effective enforcement procedures. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 565. Officers that possess 
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity may perform a minimally intrusive 
search when they observe conduct reasonably associated with criminal activity. Id
In reviewing the factors that lead an officer to perform a search of a residence, “it is 
important to recall that trained law enforcement [officers] may be ‘able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.’” Id at 
563 (quoting Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). Among the circumstances that can give 
rise to reasonable suspicion are the officer’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal 
activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices. Id “In all situations 
an officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience” when detecting illegal activity. 
Id at 564 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. at 885).
Reasonable suspicion forces a police officer to “assess facts in the light of his 
experience” to justify the use of a dog sniff. Id (quotation omitted). The Detectives here were
trained narcotics agents, who both had vast experience in locating and shutting down hydroponic 
labs. (J.A. 5, 10.) Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt did not perform a dog sniff upon a random 
home; they had articulated facts that while “wholly innocent to the untrained observer” led them 
to perceive that the house was being used as a hydroponic lab. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 563; 
(J.A. 8, 9).
Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt performed a non-invasive search to confirm the presence 
of a marijuana hydroponic lab. The dog sniff is reasonably related to the objective of confirming 
the presence of marijuana, and is not excessively intrusive. The anonymous tip, closed blinds, 
and continuously running air conditioner were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the dog 
sniff would turn up evidence of a marijuana hydroponic lab. (J.A. 98.) The facts that predicated 
the dog sniff here indicate that, unlike the routine police stops in Prouse and BrignonTPonce. the 
Detectives did not arbitrarily sniff Respondent’s home. Because a dog sniff is required to be 
performed on such articulated facts, the risk that police officers would waste their time arbitrarily 
sniffing homes is low. As in T.L.O.. a balancing of governmental interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by allowing a dog sniff a standard of reasonableness that stops short 
of probable cause. Dog sniffs predicated upon a standard of reasonable suspicion allow the 
government adequate means of guarding the public interest, and also protect citizens from 
indiscriminate official interference.
B. Probable Cause Would Be Too Stringent a Standard and May Prevent Police 
Officers from Effectively Gathering Evidence to Support a Search Warrant.
A rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule may exact a high toll in 
human injury and frustrate efforts to prevent crime. Terry. 392 U.S. at 15. The Fourth 
Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary 
for probable cause to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to
escape. Adams. 407 U.S. at 145. “On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence 
of good police work to adopt an intermediate response” to possible criminal activity. Id A brief 
inquiry into suspicious activity, in order to obtain more information, may be reasonable in light 
of the facts known to the officer at the time. Id at 146.
Crime, even in the privacy of one’s own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to 
society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). However, this does not give officers the right to thrust 
themselves into a home because the act of obtaining proper cause would be troublesome. Id at 
14-15. To utilize the standard of reasonable suspicion officers must not be solely motivated by 
inconvenience in gathering evidence that amounts to probable cause. Id
In Johnson, an arrest was based on observations inside a home after the police had 
obtained admission without a search warrant. Id at 16. The only reason offered for not 
obtaining a search warrant was the inconvenience to the officers, and some slight delay 
necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. Id at 14-15. Officers may 
not justify forgoing probable cause and obtaining a search warrant because of inconvenience. Id 
A search predicated on reasonable suspicion may be justified, among other things, by the 
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 
367 (1964). However, the search must be contemporaneous to its justifications. Id The danger 
to the destruction of evidence must be immediate. Id at 368. In Preston, the police had the right 
to search a car when they first came on the scene of an arrest. Id But that did not give them the 
right to search the car at a later time, and at another place. Id Therefore, police should be 
allowed to search an individual when there is an immediate danger of destruction of evidence.
Preston recognizes that the danger of evidence loss can be a significant concern to law 
enforcement. When police seek to discover the presence of contraband there is a time sensitive 
danger of destruction of evidence. While a growing operation would probably not be abandoned 
within the time it takes for an officer to obtain a warrant, the sophisticated proprietors of the lab 
may, after discovering that police are surveying their operation, find a way to cover the smell 
emanating from the residence.
Police should not be forced to walk away from suspected criminal activity, when a dog 
sniff allows officers a non-intrusive means to confirm the presence of contraband before 
obtaining a search warrant. Here, the Detectives performed the dog sniff upon reasonable 
suspicion, but not because it would be inconvenient to articulate facts which would amount to 
probable cause. On the contrary, the Detectives needed to confirm the presence of marijuana 
before Respondent could find a way to prevent the smell from escaping the front door. The 
Detectives then obtained a valid search warrant after the dog sniff confirmed the presence of 
contraband. (J. A. 8-9, 36-37.) Furthermore, unlike the search performed by officers in Johnson, 
the dog sniff predicated on reasonable suspicion allowed the Detectives an intermediate response 
to criminal activity which did not intrude into the suspect’s residence.
C. Probable Cause Is the Wrong Standard Where Plain View Exists.
The additional evidence that would be necessary to sustain a standard of probable cause 
is not necessary when present evidence is in plain view. See Hicks. 480 U.S. at 325 (holding that 
an officer may inspect possibly stolen stereo equipment while in a residence for an alterior 
investigative purpose, but may not violate additional privacy interest by physically moving the 
equipment). Mere inspections of objects or places which come into plain view would not have 
constituted an independent search requiring probable cause because it would not produce any
additional invasion of an individual’s privacy interest. Hicks. 480 U.S. at 325. Furthermore, 
odors can be evidence sufficient to constitute probable grounds for a search. Johnson. 333 U.S. 
at 13. Where “[t]he presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant 
qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, 
this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant.” Id
Unlike the police officers in Hicks, the Detectives in this case did not exercise any 
additional force upon the person or property of Respondent. The Detectives simply allowed 
Frankie to sniff the air surrounding Respondent’s front door. Under Johnson, any odors 
emanating from inside the house to the exterior of the house, via the front door, would be within 
plain smell of the public. Respondent did not have a privacy expectation for smells around his 
front door that he exposed to the public. Frankie only confirmed the presence of the smell of 
marijuana so that Detective Pedraja could obtain a search warrant to perform a full blown search 
of the residence.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling and hold that no Fourth 
Amendment search occurred in front of Respondent’s house because under the well-established 
test used in Katz. Respondent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the smell of 
marijuana wafting outside his house. In addition, the dog sniff does not implicate any of this 
Court’s stated concerns in Kyllo about invasive technology shrinking the realm of guaranteed 
privacy rights in American homes. Applying the Florida Supreme Court’s definition of a 
“search” on a national level will contradict existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and needlessly 
complicate an area of the law in which tliis Court has sought to preserve clarity. This Court
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should hold that the dog sniff conducted in on Respondent’s porch was performed within the 
framework of Fourth Amendment doctrine and did not constitute an unreasonable search.
In addition, considering the facts as stated at the evidentiary hearing, the Florida Supreme 
Court was incorrect in concluding that a dog sniff is the type of intrusive search which requires 
probable cause. The Florida Supreme Court erred when it concluded that a search for evidence 
can never be conducted on less then probable cause. According to Terry and Skinner, when this 
Court finds that law enforcement has special needs, this Court balances the governmental against 
the privacy interests to assess the applicability of reasonable suspicion. Here, the government 
has a special law enforcement need to confirm the presence of marijuana at a residence operating 
as a hydroponic lab. The government has a strong interest in shutting down hydroponic labs, and 
Respondent does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the smell of marijuana 
emanating from his residence. Reasonable suspicion allows the goverrmient adequate means of 
guarding the public interest, and also protects citizens from indiscriminate official interference. 
Furthermore, there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the dog sniff would turn up 
evidence of the hydroponic lab. A dog sniff therefore may be predicated on reasonable 
suspicion, which existed here.
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